

**BEFORE THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

DOCKET NO. 2013-201-WS

In the Matter of:

**Application of Utility Services of)
South Carolina, Inc. For Adjustment)
of Rates and Charges and)
Modification of Certain Terms and)
Conditions for the Provision of)
Water and Sewer Service)**

Prepared Rebuttal Testimony

of

**Dylan W. D'Ascendis, CRRA
Principal
AUS Consultants**

On Behalf of

Utility Services of South Carolina, Inc

October 16, 2013

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1 **Introduction**

2 **Q. Please state your name, occupation and business address.**

3 A. My name is Dylan W. D'Ascendis and I am a Principal of AUS Consultants. My
4 business address is 155 Gaither Drive, Suite A, Mt. Laurel, New Jersey 08054.

5 **Q. Are you the same Dylan W. D'Ascendis who previously submitted prepared direct**
6 **testimony in this proceeding?**

7 A. Yes, I am.

8 **Q. Have you prepared an exhibit which supports your rebuttal testimony?**

9 A. Yes, I have. It has been marked for identification as Exhibit DWD-2 and consists of
10 Schedules 1R through 3R.

11 **Purpose**

12 **Q. What is the purpose of this testimony?**

13 A. The purpose of this testimony is to rebut certain aspects of the direct testimony of
14 Douglas H. Carlisle, witness for the Office of the Regulatory Staff (ORS). Specifically, I
15 will address Dr. Carlisle's use of multiple proxies for growth in his Discounted Cash
16 Flow Model (DCF); his application of the Comparable Earnings Model; his mis-
17 application of the CAPM; and, his failure to reflect the risk of Utility Services of South
18 Carolina, Inc.'s (USSC or the Company) relative small size in relation to the proxy group
19 in his common equity cost rate recommendation.

20 **Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF)**

21 **Q. On page 5, lines 12-15 of his direct testimony, Dr. Carlisle discusses his use of**
22 **various historical measures of growth in his DCF. Please comment.**

23 A. Dr. Carlisle used historical measures of growth in earnings per share (EPS), book value

1 per share (BVPS), sales/revenue and dividends per share (DPS). As discussed in my
2 prepared direct testimony at page 12, line 22 through page 13, line 13, it is appropriate to
3 rely exclusively upon security analysts' forecasted growth rates in EPS which Dr. Carlisle
4 did note that he relied upon, in part, on page 6 at lines 1 through 5.

5 **Q. Is there academic literature that supports your exclusive use of analysts' estimates**
6 **in your DCF analysis?**

7 A. Yes. Earnings expectations have a significant influence on market prices and the
8 "appreciation" or "growth" experienced by investors. Myron Gordon, the "father" of the
9 standard regulatory version of the DCF model, recognized the significance of analysts'
10 forecasts of growth in EPS in a speech he gave in March 1990 before the Institute for
11 Quantitative Research and Finance. He said:

12 We have seen that earnings and growth estimates by security analysts were
13 found by Malkiel and Cragg to be superior to data obtained from financial
14 statements for the explanation of variation in price among common stocks.
15 . . . estimates by security analysts available from sources such as IBES are
16 far superior to the data available to Malkiel and Cragg. Eq (7) is not as
17 elegant as Eq (4), but it has a good deal more intuitive appeal. It says that
18 investors buy earnings, but what they will pay for a dollar of earnings
19 increases with the extent to which the earnings are reflected in the
20 dividend or in appreciation through growth.

21
22 Professor Gordon recognized that total return is largely affected by the terminal price
23 which is mostly affected by earnings (hence price / earnings multiples).

24 In addition, Morin notes¹:

25 Because of the dominance of institutional investors and their influence on
26 individual investors, analysts' forecasts of long-run growth rates provide
27 a sound basis for estimating required returns. Financial analysts exert a
28 strong influence on the expectations of many investors who do not
29 possess the resources to make their own forecasts, that is, they are a cause

¹ Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance (Public Utilities Reports, Inc., 2006) 298.

1 of g. The accuracy of these forecasts in the sense of whether they turn out
2 to be correct is not at issue here, as long as they reflect widely held
3 expectations. As long as the forecasts are typical and/or influential in that
4 they are consistent with current stock price levels, they are relevant. The
5 use of analysts' forecasts in the DCF model is sometimes denounced on
6 the grounds that it is difficult to forecast earnings and dividends for only
7 one year, let alone for longer time periods. This objection is unfounded,
8 however, because it is present investor expectations that are being priced;
9 it is the consensus forecast that is embedded in price and therefore in
10 required return, and not the future as it will turn out to be.
11

12 * * *

13 Published studies in the academic literature demonstrate that growth
14 forecasts made by security analysts represent an appropriate source of
15 DCF growth rates, are reasonable indicators of investor expectations and
16 are more accurate than forecasts based on historical growth. These
17 studies show that investors rely on analysts' forecasts to a greater extent
18 than on historic data only.
19

20 Studies performed by Cragg and Malkiel² demonstrate that analysts' forecasts are
21 superior to historical growth rate extrapolations. Some question the accuracy of analysts'
22 forecast of EPS growth, however, it does not really matter what the level of accuracy of
23 those analysts' forecasts is well after the fact. What is important is that they reflect
24 widely held expectations influencing investors at the time they make their pricing
25 decisions and hence the market prices they pay.

26 In addition, Jeremy J. Siegel also supports the use of security analysts' EPS
27 growth forecasts when he states³:

28 For the equity holder, the source of future cash flows is the earnings of firms. (p.
29 90)

30 * * *

² Cragg, John G. and Malkiel, Burton G., Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices (University of Chicago Press, 1982) Chapter 4.

³ Jeremy J. Siegel, Stocks for the Long Run – The Definitive Guide to Financial Market Returns and Long-Term Investment Strategies, McGraw-Hill 2002 90-94.

1 Some people argue that shareholders most value stocks' cash dividends. But this
2 is not necessarily true. (p. 91)

3 * * *

4 Since the price of a stock depends primarily on the present discounted value of all
5 expected future dividends, it appears that dividend policy is crucial to determining
6 the value of the stock. However this is not generally true. (p. 92)

7 * * *

8 Since stock prices are the present value of future dividends, it would seem natural
9 to assume that economic growth would be an important factor influencing future
10 dividends and hence stock prices. However, this is not necessarily so. The
11 determinants of stock prices are earnings and dividends on a *per-share* basis.
12 Although economic growth may influence *aggregate* earnings and dividends
13 favorably, economic growth does not necessarily increase the growth of per-share
14 earnings or dividends. It is earnings per share (EPS) that is important to Wall
15 Street because per-share data, not aggregate earnings or dividends, are the basis of
16 investor returns. (italics in original) (pp. 93-94)

17
18 Investors are also aware of the accuracy of past forecasts, whether for EPS or DPS
19 growth or for interest rates levels. Investors have no prior knowledge of the accuracy of
20 any forecasts available at the time they make their investment decisions, as that accuracy
21 only becomes known after some future period of time has elapsed. Therefore, given the
22 overwhelming academic/empirical support regarding the superiority of security analysts'
23 EPS growth rate forecasts, such EPS growth rate projections should be relied upon in a
24 cost of common equity analysis.

25 Since investors have such analysts' earnings growth rate projections available to
26 them and investors are aware of the superiority of such projections, analysts' projections
27 of EPS growth should receive significant, if not exclusive weight in a DCF analysis.

28 **Q. What would Dr. Carlisle's DCF result have been had he correctly relied upon**
29 **security analysts' forecasted growth in EPS?**

30 **A.** Please see Exhibit DWD-2, Schedule 1R. Using the average dividend yield for his proxy

1 group, 3.55% (from page 1 of Exhibit DHC-6) and the average security analysts'
2 forecasted growth in EPS of 6.23% (also from page 1 of Exhibit DHC-6), a DCF derived
3 common equity cost rate of 10.00% results.

4 **Comparable Earnings Model (CEM)**

5 **Q. Please comment on Dr. Carlisle's selection of comparable companies for his**
6 **comparable earnings model.**

7 **A.** There is no basis to conclude that his group of 137 *Value Line* companies is comparable
8 in total risk to the nine water companies. His criteria, as outlined on page 8, line 20
9 through page 9, line 14 of his direct testimony, were that the companies not be foreign,
10 financial or utility companies as indicated by *Value Line*; have betas within the range of
11 0.15 below the minimum beta of the nine water companies and 0.15 above the maximum
12 beta for the group; and, have a 10-year BVPS growth rate and a projected BVPS growth
13 rate. In my opinion, this is not a set of criteria that would result in a group of companies
14 comparable in total risk to his proxy group of water companies as it encompasses only
15 one measure of risk, beta, which is a measure of only systematic or market risk.

16 My selection criteria of non-regulated companies is more robust than Dr.
17 Carlisle's because it includes unsystematic risk and systematic risk, measured by the
18 standard error of the regression and unadjusted betas, respectively. If the collective
19 standard errors of the regressions and average betas of the group of non-price regulated
20 companies chosen as a proxy for the nine water companies are similar, then the total, or
21 aggregate, combined systematic and unsystematic risks are similar as noted in
22 "Comparable Earnings: New Life for an Old Precept" provided in Exhibit DWD-2
23 Schedule 2R. *Thus, because the non-price regulated companies are selected based upon*

1 *market data, they are comparable in total risk (even though individual risks may vary) to*
2 *the proxy group of water companies. It is after all, total risk which is reflected in market*
3 *prices which the comparable risk, non-price regulated, companies were selected.*

4 **Q. Is there a mismatch in Dr. Carlisle's CEM analysis because his CEM result is based**
5 **on mean book value growth where his utility proxy group recommendation is based**
6 **on market-based models?**

7 **A. Yes. Dr. Carlisle is comparing apples and oranges when he compares the book value**
8 **growth of his non-regulated proxy group to his market results for his utility proxy group.**
9 **The easiest way to correct this error would be to perform DCF and CAPM analyses on his**
10 **non-regulated proxy group. It is evident that Dr. Carlisle's CEM analysis is inadequate**
11 **and should not be considered by this Commission.**

12 Since Dr. Carlisle and I use the same proxy group of water companies, it would be
13 more appropriate for Dr. Carlisle to adopt my group of domestic, non-price regulated
14 companies presented in Schedules 7 and 8 of Exhibit DWD-1 and the indicated common
15 equity cost of 10.83% shown on Exhibit DWD-1, Schedule 8, page 1.

16 **CAPM Analysis**

17 **Q. Do you have any comment on Dr. Carlisle's application of the CAPM?**

18 **A. Yes. Dr. Carlisle's application of the CAPM has several flaws, first, his calculation of**
19 **the R_m , or return on the market is incorrectly derived, second, his use of the geometric**
20 **mean is not valid for cost of capital purposes, and finally, Dr. Carlisle fails to use the**
21 **Empirical CAPM (ECAPM) in his analysis.**

1 **Q. Please explain how Dr. Carlisle miscalculated the return on the market in his CAPM**
2 **analysis.**

3 A. Dr. Carlisle simply averages the returns by decile to derive his average return of 11.1% on
4 page 96 of the SBBI 2013 Classic Yearbook (page 88 of the Valuation Yearbook). This
5 is not correct, because that average produces higher than expected results due to the
6 higher returns of smaller companies which are weighted more heavily. The correct
7 number to be used is found at the bottom of the chart shown on page 96 under
8 “NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Total Value Weighted Index” of 9.6%. This geometric return,
9 however, is not appropriate for cost of capital purposes.

10 **Q. Why isn’t the geometric mean appropriate for cost of capital purposes?**

11 A. As I stated in my direct testimony at page 18, lines 10 through 17,

12 Arithmetic mean return rates and yields are appropriate because historical
13 total returns and equity risk premiums provide insight into the variance
14 and standard deviation of returns needed by investors in estimating future
15 risk when making an investment. If investors alternatively relied upon the
16 geometric mean of historical risk premiums, they would have no insight
17 into the potential variance of future returns because the geometric mean
18 relates the change over many periods to a constant rate of change, thereby
19 obviating the year-to-year fluctuations, or variance, *critical to risk*
20 *analysis.*

21
22 Also in my direct testimony I cited Ibbotson’s 2013 Yearbook, whose data Dr. Carlisle
23 relies on for his equity return. It states on page 56 of its Valuation Yearbook;

24 For use as the expected equity risk premium in either the CAPM or the
25 building block approach, the arithmetic mean or the simple difference of
26 the arithmetic means of stock market returns and riskless rates is the
27 relevant number.
28

1 **Q. Is there additional documentation in the academic literature that supports the**
2 **arithmetic mean as the only mean appropriate for cost of capital analysis?**

3 **A. Yes. The financial literature is quite clear on this point, that risk is measured by the**
4 **variability of expected returns, i.e., the probability distribution of returns. As noted above,**
5 **the arithmetic mean calculated over a very long period of time is the correct mean to use**
6 **when estimating the cost of capital.**

7 Weston and Brigham⁴ provide the standard financial textbook definition of the
8 riskiness of an asset when they state:

9 The riskiness of an asset is defined in terms of the likely variability of
10 future returns from the asset. (emphasis added)

11
12 Morin⁵ states :

13 The geometric mean answers the question of what constant return you
14 would have to achieve in each year to have your investment growth match
15 the return achieved by the stock market. The arithmetic mean answers the
16 question of what growth rate is the best estimate of the future amount of
17 money that will be produced by continually reinvesting in the stock
18 market. It is the rate of return which, compounded over multiple periods,
19 gives the mean of the probability distribution of ending wealth. (emphasis
20 added)

21
22 In addition, Brealey and Myers⁶ note:

23 The proper uses of arithmetic and compound rates of return from past
24 investments are often misunderstood. . . Thus the arithmetic average of
25 the returns correctly measures the opportunity cost of capital for
26 investments. . . *Moral:* If the cost of capital is estimated from historical
27 returns or risk premiums, use arithmetic averages, not compound annual
28 rates of return. (italics in original)

4 J. Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham, Essentials of Managerial Finance, 3rd Ed. (The Dryden Press, 1974) 272.

5 Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance (Public Utility Reports, Inc., 2006) 133.

6 Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance (McGraw-Hill Publications, Inc., 1996) 146-147.

As noted above, investors gain insight into relative riskiness by analyzing expected future variability. Even more simply, using the geometric mean to estimate the equity risk premium is tantamount to reading the first and last page of a world history book and presuming to know what happened during the course of human events. Consequently, Dr. Carlisle should have relied on the arithmetic NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Total Value Weighted Index of 11.6% shown on page 96 of the SBBI Classic Yearbook.

Q. Dr. Carlisle neglected to include an ECAPM in his analysis. Please comment.

A. Numerous tests of the CAPM have measured the extent to which security returns and betas are related as predicted by the CAPM confirming its validity. However, Morin observes that while the results of these tests support the notion that beta is related to security returns, the empirical Security Market Line (SML) described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. Morin⁷ states:

With few exceptions, the empirical studies agree that ... low-beta securities earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict, and high-beta securities earn less than predicted.

* * *

Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that the expected return on a security is related to its risk by the following approximation:

$$K = R_F + x \beta(R_M - R_F) + (1-x) \beta(R_M - R_F)$$

where x is a fraction to be determined empirically. The value of x that best explains the observed relationship $\text{Return} = 0.0829 + 0.0520 \beta$ is between 0.25 and 0.30.

If $x = 0.25$, the equation becomes:

$$K = R_F + 0.25(R_M - R_F) + 0.75 \beta(R_M - R_F)^8$$

⁷ Morin 175.

⁸ Morin 190.

1
2 In view of theory and practical research, both the traditional CAPM and the
3 ECAPM should be used.

4 **Q. What would Dr. Carlisle's indicated common equity cost rate based on the CAPM if**
5 **he would have applied the model correctly?**

6 A. Please see Exhibit DWD-2, Schedule 3R. When the CAPM is applied correctly, Dr.
7 Carlisle would have derived an indicated common equity cost rate of 9.50%.

8 **Q. What would be Dr. Carlisle's corrected indicated range of common equity cost**
9 **rates?**

10 A. It would be from 9.50% (CAPM) to 10.83% (CEM) with the DCF result of 10.00%
11 falling within the range. The midpoint of the range is 10.17%. However, this range mis-
12 specifies the common equity cost for USSC as it does not reflect USSC's greater relative
13 risk due to its small size.

14 **Size Adjustment**

15 **Q. Please discuss the risk implications of USSC's small size relative to nine water**
16 **companies. Does Dr. Carlisle's corrected range of common equity cost rates, 9.50% -**
17 **10.83%, adequately reflect the risk of USSC's small size relative to the nine water**
18 **companies?**

19 A. No. As I stated at page 29, line 11 through page 30, line 3, smaller companies tend to be
20 more risky, causing investors to expect greater returns as compensation for that risk,
21 consistent with the basic financial principle of risk and return. Another basic financial
22 principle is that it is the use of the funds invested and not the source of those funds which
23 gives rise to the risk of any investment. Since USSC is the regulated utility to whose

1 jurisdictional rate base the overall cost of capital allowed by the Commission in this
2 proceeding will be applied, the relevant risk reflected in the cost of capital must be that of
3 USSC, including the impact of its small size on common equity cost rate.

4 **Q. Does Dr. Carlisle agree that USSC should be evaluated as a stand-alone enterprise?**

5 A. Yes. At page 3, lines 1-2, Dr. Carlisle says USSC was “to be treated as a publicly-traded
6 company by applying for a rate-based, return-on-equity proceeding”.

7 **Q. What is the size-adjusted, corrected range of common equity cost rates indicated by
8 Dr. Carlisle’s study?**

9 A. When a size adjustment of 0.40%⁹ is added to the corrected indicated range of common
10 equity cost rates from 9.50% (CAPM) to 10.83% (CEM) discussed above, a range of
11 9.90% to 11.23% with a midpoint of 10.57% results. This range overlaps my range of
12 reasonable common equity cost rates.

13 **Q. Does that conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

14 A. Yes.

⁹ From Exhibit DWD-1, Schedule 1, page 2, Line No., 7.

Utility Services of South Carolina, Inc.
Correction of Dr. Carlisle's DCF Analysis
Using Forecasts of EPS Growth Exclusively

<u>Indicator</u>	<u>Historical</u>	<u>Projected</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>Source</u>
EPS	7.20%	6.23%	6.71%	Exhibit DHC-2
BVPS	4.89%	4.71%	4.80%	Exhibit DHC-3
Sales/Rev.	6.81%	6.25%	6.53%	Exhibit DHC-4
DPS	3.37%	7.32%	5.35%	Exhibit DHC-5
			6.23%	Projected EPS Growth Rate
			3.55%	Exhibits DHC-1, p.3 of 5, DHC-7, DHC-9
			0.22%	Calculated, multiplication of above two lines
			10.00%	DCF Recommendation

Source of Information:
Exhibit DHC-6.

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Comparable Earnings: New Life for an Old Precept

by
Frank J. Hanley
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Comparable Earnings: New Life for an Old Precept

Accelerating deregulation has greatly increased the investment risk of natural gas utilities. As a result, the authors believe it more appropriate than ever to employ the comparable earnings model. We believe our application of the model overcomes the greatest traditional objection to it — lack of comparability of the selected non-utility proxy firms. Our illustration focuses on a target gas pipeline company with a beta of 0.96 — almost equal to the market's beta of 1.00.

Introduction

The comparable earnings model used to determine a common equity cost rate is deeply rooted in the standard of "corresponding risk" enunciated in the landmark *Bluefield* and *Hope* decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.¹ With such solid grounding in the foundations of rate of return regulation, comparable earnings should be accepted as a principal model, along with the currently popular market-based models, provided that its most common criticism, non-comparability of the proxy companies, is overcome.

Our comparable earnings model overcomes the non-comparability issue of the non-utility firms selected as a proxy for the target utility, in this example, a gas pipeline company. We should note that in the absence of common stock prices for the target utility (as with a wholly-owned subsidiary), it is appropriate to use the average of a proxy group of similar risk gas pipeline companies whose common stocks are actively traded. As we will demonstrate, our selection process results in a group of domestic, non-utility firms that is comparable in total risk, the sum of business and financial risk, which reflects both non-diversifiable systematic, or market, risk as well as diversifiable unsystematic, or firm-specific, risk.



Frank J. Hanley is president of AUS Consultants — Utility Services Group. He has testified in several hundred rate proceedings on the subject of cost of capital before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and 27 state regulatory commissions. Before joining AUS in 1971, he was an assistant treasurer of a number of operating companies in the American Water Works System, as well as a financial planning officer with the Philadelphia National Bank. He is a Certified Rate of Return Analyst.



Pauline M. Ahern is a senior financial analyst with AUS Consultants — Utility Services Group. She has participated in many cost-of-capital studies. A former employee of the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, she holds an MBA degree from Rutgers University and is a Certified Rate of Return Analyst.

Embedded in the Landmark Decisions

As stated in *Bluefield* in 1922: "A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return ... on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties ..."

In addition, the court stated in *Hope* in 1944: "By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks"

Thus, the "corresponding risk" pre-

cept of *Bluefield* and *Hope* predates the use of such market-based cost-of-equity models as the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and Capital Asset Pricing (CAPM), which were developed later and are currently popular in rate-base/rate-of-return regulation. Consequently, the comparable earnings model has a longer regulatory and judicial history. However, it has far greater relevance now than ever before in its history because significant deregulation has substantially increased natural gas utilities' investment risk to a level similar to that of non-utility firms. As a result, it is

Comparable Earnings *from page 4*

more important than ever to look to similar-risk non-utility firms for insight into common equity cost rate, especially in view of the deficiencies inherent in the currently popular market-based cost of common equity models, particularly the DCF model.

Despite the fact that the landmark decisions are still regarded as having set the standards for determining a fair rate of return, the comparable earnings model has experienced decreased usage by expert witnesses, as well as less regulatory acceptance over the years. We believe the decline in the popularity of the comparable earnings model, in large measure, is attributable to the difficulty of selecting non-utility proxy firms that regulators will accept as comparable to the target utility. Regulatory acceptance is difficult to gain when the selection process is arbitrary. Our application of the model is objective and consistent with fundamental financial tenets.

Principles of Comparable Earnings

Regulation is a substitute for the competition of the marketplace. Moreover, regulated public utilities compete in the capital markets with all firms, including unregulated non-utilities. The comparable earnings model is based upon the opportunity cost principle; i.e., that the true cost of an investment is the return that could have been earned on the next best available alternative investment of similar risk. Consequently, the comparable earnings model is consistent with regulatory and financial principles, as it is a surrogate for the competition of the marketplace, and investors seek the greatest available rate of return for bearing similar risk.

The selection of comparable firms is the most difficult step in applying the comparable earnings model, as noted by Phillips² as well as by Bonbright, Danielsen and Kamerschen.³ The selection of non-utility proxy firms should result in a sufficiently broad-based group in order to minimize the effect of company-specific aberrations. How-

ever, if the selection process is arbitrary, it likely would result in a proxy group that is too broad-based, such as the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Index or the Value Line Industrial Composite. The use of such groups would require subjective adjustments to the comparable earnings results to reflect risk differences between the group(s) and the target utility, a gas pipeline company in this example.

Authors' Selection Criteria

We base the selection of comparable non-utility firms on market-based, objective, quantitative measures of risk resulting from market prices that subsume investors' assessments of all elements of risk. Thus, our approach is based upon the principle of risk and return; namely, that firms of comparable risk should be expected to earn comparable returns. It is also consistent with the "corresponding risk" standard established in *Bluefield* and *Hope*. We measure total investment risk as the sum of non-diversifiable systematic and diversifiable unsystematic risk. We use the unadjusted beta as a measure of systematic risk and the standard error of the estimate (residual standard error) as a measure of unsystematic risk. Both the unadjusted beta and the residual standard error are derived from a regression of the target utility's security returns relative to the market's returns, which takes the general form:

$$r_{it} = a_i + b_i r_{mt} + e_{it}$$

where:

- r_{it} = i th observation of the i th utility's rate of return
- r_{mt} = t th observation of the market's rate of return
- e_{it} = i th random error term
- a_i = constant least-squares regression coefficient
- b_i = least-squares regression slope coefficient, the unadjusted beta.

As shown by Francis,⁴ the total variation or risk of a firm's return, $\text{Var}(r_i)$, comes from two sources:

$\text{Var}(r_i)$ = total risk of i th asset

$$\begin{aligned} &= \text{var}(a_i + b_i r_m + e) \\ &\quad \text{substituting } (a_i + b_i r_m + e) \\ &\quad \text{for } r_i \\ &= \text{var}(b_i r_m) + \text{var}(e) \text{ since } \text{var}(a_i) = 0 \\ &= b_i^2 \text{var}(r_m) + \text{var}(e) \\ &\quad \text{since } \text{var}(b_i r_m) = b_i^2 \\ &\quad \text{var}(r_m) \\ &= \text{systematic} + \\ &\quad \text{unsystematic risk} \end{aligned}$$

Francis⁵ also notes: "The term $\sigma^2(r_i|r_m)$ is called the *residual variance around the regression line* in statistical terms or *unsystematic risk* in capital market theory language. $\sigma^2(r_i|r_m) = \dots = \text{var}(e)$. The residual variance is the squared standard error in regression language, a measure of unsystematic risk." Application of these criteria results in a group of non-utility firms whose average total investment risk is indeed comparable to that of the target gas pipeline.

As a measure of systematic risk, we use the Value Line unadjusted beta. Beta measures the extent to which market-wide or macro-economic events affect a firm's stock price. We use the unadjusted beta of the target utility as a starting point because it results from the regression of the target utility's security returns relative to the market's returns. Thus, the resulting standard deviation of beta relates to the unadjusted beta. We use the standard deviation of the unadjusted beta to determine the range around it as the selection criterion based on systematic risk.

We use the residual standard error of the regression as a measure of unsystematic risk. The residual standard error reflects the extent to which events specific to the firm's operations affect a firm's stock price. Thus, it is a measure of diversifiable, unsystematic, firm-specific risk.

An Illustration of Authors' Approach

Step One: We begin our approach by establishing the selection criteria as a range of both unadjusted beta and residual standard error of the target gas

continued on page 6

Comparable Earnings from page 5

pipeline company.

As shown in table 1, our target gas pipeline company has a Value Line unadjusted beta of 0.90, whose standard deviation is 0.1250. The selection criterion range of unadjusted beta is the unadjusted beta plus (+) and minus (-) three of its standard deviations. By using three standard deviations, 99.73 percent of the comparable unadjusted betas is captured.

Three standard deviations of the target utility's unadjusted beta equals 0.38 ($0.1250 \times 3 = 0.3750$, rounded to 0.38). Consequently, the range of unadjusted betas to be used as a selection criteria is $0.52 - 1.28$ ($0.52 = 0.90 - 0.38$) and $(1.28 = 0.90 + 0.38)$.

Likewise, the selection criterion range of residual standard error equals the residual standard error plus (+) and

minus (-) three of its standard deviations. The standard deviation of the residual standard error is defined as: $\sigma/\sqrt{2N}$.

As also shown in table 1, the target gas pipeline company has a residual standard error of 3.7867. According to the above formula, the standard deviation of the residual standard error would be 0.1664 ($0.1664 = 3.7867/\sqrt{2(259)} = 3.7867/22.7596$, where $259 = N$, the number of weekly price change observations over a period of five years). Three standard deviations of the target utility's residual standard error would be 0.4992 ($0.1664 \times 3 = .4992$). Consequently, the range of residual standard errors to be used as a selection criterion is $3.2875 - 4.2859$ ($3.2875 = 3.7867 - 0.4992$) and $(4.2859 = 3.7867 + 0.4992)$.

Step Two: The step one criteria are applied to Value Line's data base of nearly 4,000 firms for which Value Line derives unadjusted betas and residual standard errors on a weekly basis. All firms with unadjusted betas and residual standard errors within the criteria ranges are then selected.

Step Three: In the regulatory ratemaking environment, authorized common equity return rates are applied to a book-value rate base. Thus, the earnings rates on book common equity, or net worth, of competitive, non-utility firms are highly relevant provided those firms are indeed comparable in total risk to the target gas pipeline. The use of the return rates of other utilities has no relevance because their allowed, and hence subsequently achieved, earnings rates are dependent upon the regulatory

table 1

Summary of the Comparable Earnings Analysis for the Proxy Group of 248 Non-Utility Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Target Gas Pipeline Company¹

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	adj. beta	unadj. beta	residual standard error	3-year average ²	4-year average ²	5-year average ²	5-year projected ³	
average for the proxy group of 248 non-utility companies comparable in total risk to the target gas pipeline company	0.97	0.92	3.7705					
target gas pipeline company	0.96	0.90 ⁴	3.7867					
median				11.7%	12.0%	12.6%	15.5%	
average of the median historical returns					12.1%			
conclusion ⁵								13.8%

¹The criteria for selection of the non-utility group was that the non-utility companies be domestic and included in Value Line Investment Survey. The non-utility group was selected based on an unadjusted beta range of 0.52 to 1.28 and a residual standard error range of 3.2875 to 4.2859.

²Ending 1992.

³1996-1998/1997-1999.

⁴The average standard deviation of the target gas pipeline company's unadjusted beta is 0.1250.

⁵Equal weight given to both the average of the 3-, 4- and 5-year historical medians (12.1%) and 5-year projected median rate of return on net worth (15.5%). Thus, $13.8\% = (12.1\% + 15.5\% / 2)$.

Source: Value Line Inc., March 15, 1994.

Value Line Investment Survey.

Comparable Earnings *from page 6*

process. Consequently, we believe all utilities must be eliminated to avoid circularity. Moreover, we believe non-domestic firms must be eliminated because their reporting methods differ significantly from U.S. firms.



Step Four: We then eliminated those firms for which Value Line does not publish a "Ratings & Report" in *Value Line Investment Survey* so that the historical and projected returns on net worth⁶ are from a consistent source. We use historical returns on net worth for the most recent five years, as well as those projected three to five years into the future. We believe it is logical to evaluate both historical and projected return rates because it is reasonable to assume that investors avail themselves of both when they are available from widely disseminated information ser-

vices, such as Value Line Inc. The use of Value Line's return rates on net worth understates the common equity return rates for two reasons. First, preferred stock is included in net worth. Second, the net worth return rates are as of the end of each period. Thus, the use of average common equity return rates would yield higher results.

Step Five: Median returns based on the historical average three, four and five years ending 1992 and projected 1996-1998 or 1997-1999 rates of return on net worth are then determined as shown in columns 4 through 7 of table 1. The median is used due to the wide variations and skewness in rates of return on net worth for the non-utility firms as evidenced by the frequency distributions of those returns as shown in illustration 1.

However, we show the average unadjusted beta, 0.92, and residual standard error, 3.7705, for the proxy group in columns 2 and 3 of table 1 because their frequency distributions are not significantly skewed, as shown in illustration 2.

Step Six: Our conclusion of a com-
continued on page 8



Comparable Earnings *from page 7*

comparable earnings cost rate is based upon the mid-point of the average of the median three-, four- and five-year historical rates of return on net worth of 12.1 percent as shown in column 5 and the median projected 1996-1998/1997-1999 rate of return on net worth of 15.5 percent as shown in column 7 of table 1. As shown in column 8, it is 13.8 percent.

Summary

Our comparable earnings approach demonstrates that it is possible to select a proxy group of non-utility firms that is comparable in total risk to a target utility. In our example, the 13.8 percent comparable earnings cost rate is very conservative as it is an expected achieved rate on book common equity (a regulatory allowed rate should be

greater) and because it is based on end-of-period net worth. A similar rate on average net worth would be about 20 to 40 basis points higher (i.e., 14.0 to 14.2 percent) and still understate the appropriate regulatory allowed rate of return on book common equity.

Our selection criteria are based upon measures of systematic and unsystematic risk, specifically unadjusted beta and residual standard error. They provide the basis for the objective selection of comparable non-utility firms. Our selection criteria rely on changes in market prices over approximately five years. We compare the aggregate total risk, or the sum of systematic and unsystematic risk, which reflects investors' aggregate assessment of both business and financial risk. Thus, no adjustments are necessary to the proxy group results to

compensate for the differences in business risk and financial risk, such as accounting practices and debt/equity ratios. Moreover, it is inappropriate to attempt a comparison of the target utility with any individual firm, or subset of firms, in the proxy group because only the average firm of the group is relevant.

Because the comparable earnings model is firmly anchored in the "corresponding risk" precept established in the landmark court decisions, it is worthy of consideration as a principal model for use in estimating the cost rate of common equity capital of a regulated utility. Our approach to the comparable earnings model produces a proxy group that is indeed comparable in total risk because the selection process is objective and quantitative. It therefore overcomes criticism linked to arbitrary selection processes.

All cost-of-common-equity models, including the DCF and CAPM, are fraught with deficiencies, usually stemming from the many necessary but unrealistic assumptions that underlie them. The effects of the deficiencies of individual models can be mitigated by using more than one model when estimating a utility's common equity cost rate. Therefore, when the non-comparability issue is overcome, the comparable earnings model deserves to receive the same consideration as a primary model, as do the currently popular market-based models. ■

Report Lists Pipeline, Storage Projects

More than \$9 billion worth of projects to expand the nation's natural gas pipeline network are in various stages of development, according to an A.G.A. report. These projects involve nearly 8,000 miles of new pipelines and capacity additions to existing lines and represent 15.3 billion cubic feet (Bcf) per day of new pipeline capacity.

During 1993 and early 1994, construction on 3,100 miles of pipeline was completed or under way, at a cost of nearly \$4 billion, says A.G.A. These projects are adding 5.4 Bcf in daily delivery capacity nationwide.

Among the projects completed in 1993 were Pacific Gas Transmission Co.'s 805 miles of looping that allows increased deliveries of Canadian gas to the West Coast; Northwest Pipeline Corp.'s addition of 433 million cubic feet of daily capacity for customers in the Pacific Northwest and Rocky Mountain areas; and the 156-mile Empire State Pipeline in New York.

In addition, major construction projects were started on the systems of Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. and Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. — both subsidiaries of Panhandle Eastern Corp. — and along Florida Gas Transmission Co.'s pipeline.

The report goes on to discuss another \$5 billion in proposed projects, which, if completed, will add nearly 5,000 miles of pipeline and 9.8 Bcf per day in capacity, much of it serving Florida and West Coast markets.

A.G.A. also identifies 47 storage projects and says that if all of them are built, existing storage capacity will increase by more than 500 Bcf, or 15 percent.

For a copy of *New Pipeline Construction: Status Report 1993-94* (#F00103), call A.G.A. at (703) 841-8490. Price per copy is \$6 for employees of member companies and associates and \$12 for other customers.

¹*Bluefield Water Works Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission*, 262 U.S. 679 (1922) and *Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.*, 320 U.S. 519 (1944).

²Charles F. Phillips Jr., *The Regulation of Public Utilities: Theory and Practice*, Public Utilities Reports Inc., 1988, p. 379.

³James C. Bonbright, Albert L. Danielsen and David R. Kamerschen, *Principles of Public Utilities Rates*, 2nd edition, Public Utilities Reports Inc. 1988, p. 329.

⁴Jack Clark Francis, *Investments: Analysis and Management*, 3rd edition, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1980, p. 363.

⁵*Id.*, p. 548.

⁶Returns on net worth must be used when relying on Value Line data because returns on book common equity for non-utility firms are not available from Value Line.

Utility Services of South Carolina, Inc.
Correction of Dr. Carlisle's CAPM Analysis
Using the Correct Historical Equity Return
and Employing the Empirical CAPM

NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ		Quarter in Blue Chip	30 Year Treasury
Total Value Weighted Index		Forecast	Bond Rate
From 1926-2012		2Q 2013	3.15%
		3Q 2013	3.60%
		4Q 2013	3.70%
Arithmetic Mean:	11.60%	1Q 2014	3.80%
		2Q 2014	3.90%
		3Q 2014	4.00%
		4Q 2014	4.10%

CAPM Formula:

$$K = R_f + ((R_m - R_f) * \beta)$$

$$K = 4.1\% + ((11.6\% - 4.1\%) * .68)$$

$$K = 9.20\%$$

ECAPM Formula:

$$K = R_f + ((.75 * (R_m - R_f) * \beta) + (.25 * (R_m - R_f)))$$

$$K = 4.1\% + ((.75 * (11.6\% - 4.1\%) * .68) + (.25 * (11.6\% - 4.1\%)))$$

$$K = 9.80\%$$

Average of CAPM / ECAPM Analysis: **9.50%**

Sources of Information:

Ibbotson SBBI Yearbook, page 96.

Exhibits DHC-8 and DHC-7